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ABSTRACT 
Developing a three-sector and four-factor general equilibrium model, this paper offers an explanation of wage inequal- 
ity in a vertically fragmented production structure typical of off-shore outsourcing to developing countries like China or 
India. The model characterizes a typical developing economy where intermediate good is produced using capital and 
local low-skilled worker, traditional sector uses unskilled worker to produce agricultural products and skilled worker 
works in tandem with intermediates to produce final goods for export. The model furnishes that wage dispersion could 
be explained theoretically in this specific-factor general equilibrium structure where factor returns are endogenously 
determined within a production structure with middle products. In particular, scenario analysis shows that increase in 
relative price of final good aggravates wage inequality, whereas opposite happens when price of intermediates and im-
port-competing sector inflates. Skilling the unskilled and protecting the sector intensive in low-skilled could attenuate 
the adverse impact. 
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1. Overview and Background 
“We live in an age of outsourcing.”  
—Grossman and Helpman ([1], p. 135) 
1.1. Prelude 
A noticeable empirical phenomenon dominating the in- 
ternational trade literature is the evidence of wage ine- 
quality across skill categories. The issue of globalization, 
buoyancy in foreign trade and investment and its dis- 
tributive impacts via wage dispersion has received intel- 
lectual attention. The quotation above confirms the rico- 
chet effect of the current spate of global integration and 
geographical de-concentration of production, via both 
extensive and intensive growth in trade in products and 
services alike. Last few years, there has been intense de- 
bate on outsourcing and wage inequality. It is from this 
perspective that we contribute to the debate on trade- 
wage nexus. 
Outsourcing of intermediates (materials) and business 
services have become an important component of inter-
national trade along with the rising speed of globalization. 
Typically, cost-saving objective motivates sub-contract- 
ing: hiring low-wage workers from the labor-rich devel- 
oping economies. Also, fragmentation and associated 
competition from foreign firms could break the techno- 
logical barriers. Firms with laborers suited to older tech- 
niques will lose to the firms endowed with workers hav- 
ing access to new technology embodied in foreign capital 
accrued via FDI. Thus, it will give the latter a tad more 
competitive advantage to attract higher wage rates. The 
paper at hand explores the effect of fragmentation of pro- 
duction process on the labor market disaggregated on the 
basis of skill content.  However, critiques argue the re- 
lative importance of technological restructuring vis-à-vis 
off-shoring of semi-skilled and unskilled jobs to attractive 
locales such as low-wage nations like India, China, and 
Brazil from the developed nations behind the wage ine- 
quality phenomena [2,3].1 Thus, as globalization has im- 
pact on labor markets through modern supply chains ana- 
lytical framework would facilitate understanding of such 
transmission channel. This is often called “unbundling” 
1Typically, industries showing marks of this kind of splintering across 
locations of a vertically integrated production process are those with 
substantial scope of technological sophistication and invention such as: 
electronics, data processing equipment, radio, television, textiles and 
apparels, and mostly services like E-commerce, medical transcription, 
software, BPO, backroom call centers, etc., to name a few. Even these 
days, tutorials for teaching mathematics or sciences are outsourced to 
Indian teachers from especially, USA. 
*With the usual disclaimer, I acknowledge the valuable comments and 
suggestions from seminar participants at the UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, 
Finland, and Conference participants at the Oikos International Eco-
nomics Academy, at Geneva in 2011. This work was supported by the 
research fund of Hanyang University (HY-2009-N). 
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effects via revolution in technologies, e-commerce, and 
fall is transport costs. Following section briefly reviews 
the previous works. 
1.2. Brief Literature Review 
Empirically, [4] has found rapid growth in vertical spe- 
cialization trade in manufacturing thanks to fall in trade 
costs.2 Drawing on [5], [6] has also measured extent of 
outsourcing in both services and materials in Asia and 
found that developing regions in India, China, South-East 
Asia and Latin America has registered higher percentage 
of trade attributed to production-sharing in hi-technology 
products, services, and capital goods. [7] defines out- 
sourcing measure more generally to include broader mea- 
sure of intermediate inputs—“parts and components and 
contract work (either subcontracting a foreign firm to 
manufacture wholly or, the use of foreign plants for pro- 
duct assembly) done by others (p. 242)”. Also, it includes 
input purchases from foreign independent suppliers as 
well as foreign subsidiaries of multinationals firms. For 
labor market effects of such vertical trade specialization 
[8], mentions that extent of such impact depends on de-
sign and measurement differences as well as on data or 
industry level aggregation. However, [7] found that out-
sourcing or intermediate input trade caused 15% - 25% 
rise in relative wage of non-production vis-à-vis produc-
tion workers, whereas skill-biased technical change (via 
hi-tech office equipment, computer investment and in-
novation) accounted for 20% - 35% rise in wage gap 
during 1970-1990 for US manufacturing. Not only that, 
[9] has estimated that both technical change as well as 
North-South trade cause wage inequality. [10] has shown 
in a continuum of model with intermediate goods that 
trade in final goods could cause relative wage to disperse 
especially in the presence of tariff on final product. On 
an empirical plane, based on an imperfect competition 
model [11] has offered evidences of significant effect of 
outsourcing on widening wage gap in Indian manufac- 
turing sector. [12] has studied the impact of South Ko- 
rean offshoring on labor market in China and found im- 
pact on wage and employment in labor market in both 
source and destination. Given the fact that extent of such 
East Asian regional production networking is still un- 
folding, the impact is noteworthy. 
Drawing on the consensus that a middle products 
framework can accommodate variety in production with 
fragmentation and skill differentiation across labors, this 
paper develops a particular vertical production structure 
in a mixed specific-factor framework. Extension of tradi- 
tional corpus of trade theory due to fragmentation of 
production in stages has received major attention espe- 
cially under the aegis of globalization. Impact of out- 
sourcing on wage structure crucially hinges on the nature 
or type of sectors undergoing the delocalization. In other 
words, manufacturing outsourcing via traded intermedi- 
ate inputs is the conventional outsourcing mode whereas 
services outsourcing enabled by IT and associated net- 
work effects are new mode owing to SBTC. Varieties of 
production models have emerged with none claiming 
dominance. These models are variants or mixtures of 
generic models like the Ricardian type, Specific factors 
model, Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Rich array of Neo- 
Classical production models in trade considers different 
theoretical structures [13-15]. Typically, the models with 
horizontal and vertical specialization in a productive 
spectrum have been used to analyze diverse phenomena 
[16-18]. We probe beyond the quantifiable causes to 
present a theoretical justification in Section 2 to shed 
light on fragmentation and development.3 Section 3 pre-
sents results and Section 4 concludes.  
2. A General Equilibrium Model of Vertical 
Specialization 
Domestic firms in developed economies subcontract 
“non-skill-intensive” part to the foreign—host—develop- 
ing countries. Consider the case of a small open less de- 
veloped economy incompletely specializing in two trad- 
able sectors requiring different inputs produced by two 
specific heterogeneous labor types, sector-specific capital 
and one intermediate-input. More specifically, exportable 
final good (sophisticated skill-intensive good) X is pro- 
duced with skilled human capital (S) and one capital 
goods (i.e., intermediate input—I) whereas I is produced 
in a separate production nest with capital (K) and semi- 
skilled or relatively unskilled labor (i). Also, traditional 
import-competing agricultural good (Y) is produced us- 
ing only unskilled. A stylized vertical production struc- 
ture resembling this is: where some capital goods (sourced 
via arms’ length trade, intra-firm transactions, or FDI), 
and unskilled/semi-skilled labor enter into production of 
Steel used as an intermediate in conjunction with skilled 
labor to produce a final good, say Automobiles. A sche- 
matic diagram depicting such structure is given in Figure 
1. 
Abundance of low-skilled workers in host LDCs makes 
produced intermediate goods (I) cheaper than anywhere. 
This is non-traded (or, not directly traded due to prohibi- 
tive transport costs). Lower price of “I” at host gives her 
a comparative advantage in final good (X) production. It 
is a vertical productive spectrum where “I” enters into 
final goods production only after its production in initial   
3For example, relatively labor-rich nations with relatively lower wages 
would be the preferred location of choice for concentration of labor-
intensive fragments of production. 
2Ratio of value-added trade to gross trade—VAX ratio—has fallen and 
hence, showing rise in supply-chain fragmentation in production. (The 
Economist: Free Exchange-Chains of Gold, August 4, 2012). 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of a conceptual vertical specialization model.4 
 
stages. By Greenfield investment or acquisition, the firm 
transfers some of their capital to the host so that high 
wage countries combine their expertise with low-wage 
labor for producing cheaply in the host. Examples are 
plenty, such as: production of i-phone (smart phones) or 
i-pad produced with skilled engineers and semiconduc- 
tor/microchips assembled in LDCs to take advantage of 
abundant low-skilled workers to be used with sophisti- 
cated capital goods.5 Production functions represented by 
(E) are assumed to exhibit linear homogeneity and di- 
minishing returns to each type of inputs. We assume full 
employment of resources and perfectly competitive fac- 
tor and product markets. It is assumed that perfectly 
flexible real wage guarantees full-employment in the 
economy. X and Y are traded, “I” is non-traded and price 
flexibility ensures equality of domestic supply with de- 
mand. Thus, 
IP   price of intermediate input, I .  
Input-output ratios are given as below: 
m
La  amount of labor types per unit of output of m 
sector,  , ,m X Y I  , , and ; j m  ,L S U
Ia I amount of capital per unit of k ; 
Xa I amount of intermediate input required to produce 
1 unit of X ; 
r   return to capital (given as determined in the 
world market); 
,s uw w   prevailing wage rate across skill categories 
in the economy; 
m
Lm L L m  is the distributive share of labor 
types in the production of m where 
w a P 
  ,  ,  , ,m X Y I L S U    
I
KI kra P  I is the distributive share of  specific 
capital in “I”; 
thk
X
IX I I XP a P  is the share of “I” (in value terms) in 
X ;   
 
,
,
X X I S
Y Y U
I I K U
   
             (E) m
i j th
im
i
a Q
m
f
    
where  with 
respect to respective inputs.  
0,  0, 0,  0, 0, 0X X Y Y I I           commodity’s input share in  factor, where  is 
generic output and “f” is generic input types; m
thi Q
   elas- 
ticity of substitution in “m” sector’s production. Following notations are used for the model: 
jP  price of the  final good ; thj ,j X Y  , ,K S U  are given endowments of capital, skilled and 
unskilled labor respectively. 
4Adapted from Das and Han (2013, forthcoming). 
5See Feenstra and Taylor (2008) for examples. Cotton textile produced 
with raw cotton or IT-products and IT-enabled services produced with 
software, electronic ADP equipment and hardware engineer with high 
skill content are other examples. Purchase of state-owned plants in 
Eastern Europe such as Czech Republic by Western European firms.
“Λ” = proportional changes for a variable, say V  
such that generically  
dˆ VV
V
  
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Competitive equilibrium with zero pure profit condi- 
tion implies that: 
I I
I K uP a r a w    u
I
u
            (1) 
X X
X S S IP a w a P               (2) 
For the import-competing sector,  
Y
Y uP a w                 (3) 
Full employment conditions are: 
I Y
u ua I a Y U                 (4) 
X
Sa X S                  (5) 
We can write demand for the intermediate as: 
X
Ia X I                 (6) 
Rate of return for an LDC is globally determined— 
exogenously given—as are : andX YP P
r r                    (7) 
Full-employment condition for capital is not needed. 
Given Y , Equation (3), with Constant Returns to 
Scale, determines u ; given r, then we get 
P
w IP via (1). 
Once IP is determined, given X , we can solve for P sw
d
. 
Using (5), we find X, plugging which in (6) yields I. 
From (4), by replacing I, we get Y. Equations (1)-(6) are 
6 to solve for 6 variables, viz., , , , an,s u IX Y I w w P . 
The system is determinate. 
Dividing (2) and (1) by (3) yields respectively: 
X X
s s I I
X Y Y Y
u Yu u
a w a PP P
w Pa a
             (8a) 
I I
k
I Y Y
uu u
a rP P
wa a
   uY
a
            (8b) 
This implies that given factor proportions and input- 
output ratio, if relative prices of final goods change in 
favor of X (i.e.,  XP P Y ), and IP increases, then skill- 
unskilled wage gap might widen. If  YP P I , then u  
might improve. However, following section rigorously 
analyzes such effects.  
w
3. Comparative Static Changes and Analysis 
3.1. Equations of Change and Results 
Impact of vertically fragmented structure on wage ine- 
quality could easily be envisaged by exploiting the 
model’s comparative static changes in the wake of price 
variations in the general equilibrium system. Employing 
Wong-Viner envelope theorem [19] and based on [13], 
we derive from (1)-(3) and using (7): 
 
Y uYP   uw                (9) 
 
I uI uP  w  (as ˆ 0KI r   , “r” being fixed at world 
market)                                    (10) 
  
X sX s IXP w  IP              (11) 
From (11), as 
     
 
1,sX IX s X IX I sX s X
IX
X I
sX
w P P w P
P P
   


      
   
  (12) 
Using (12) with (9) and (10) sequentially, we get re- 
spectively:  
    1X IX
s u I
sX SX
Pw w P   
    uI
        (13a) 
    X IX
s u I
Y
sX SX
Pw w P 
uY
P
              (13b) 
In particular, consider scenarios (ceteris paribus): 1) 
world price of exportable increases  0, 0X IP P  ; 2) 
price of importable rises such that  0, 0Y IP P  ; 3)   0X YP P  . Propositions below elicit the policy impli- 
cations. 
Proposition 1: Assuming that skilled labor is relatively 
important factor of production in export sector, and 
capital is relatively more important in intermediate good 
production, a one-shot increase in the relative world 
price of export sector causes wage inequality to deepen 
by reinforcing the existing wage gap. 
Proof: Let  0, 0.X IP P   Considering equation sys- 
tem (12) and (13),  
    0Xs u
sX
Pw w w w    s u  (QED) 
Let    0, 1 where 0,I X IP P P      then 
   0KIs u I
SX UI
w w P  
     
          (14)  
Given  
  0,  iff KII S u
SX UI
P w w      
Given relative factor-importance (intensity) assump- 
tion 
, 1 1KIKI UI SX
UI SX
            (QED). 
Thus, more than proportionate increase in world price of 
export sector compared to the price of intermediates and 
the proportion (share) of the skilled labor used with in- 
termediate in final good production deepens wage ine- 
quality via fueling of skill demand.  
Corollary 1. Output of the exportable and intermediate 
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expands. Real wage of skilled workers increases. 
From (12) and using  1X IP P  , we derive 
   0IXs X I
sX
w P P               (15) 
Following Jones (1965, 1971) and envelope theorem, 
we get: 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ij hj
j
hj ij
a a
p p
                 (16) 
and   ˆ ˆij hj j hj ija p   pˆ
 a
          (17) 
  , , , , ,j X I i h S U K I      re inputs and h ip p  
r input prices. are facto
Using (5), (6) and (17), we get 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆXS IX X S I X a w     P
ˆ
         (18) 
and  
ˆ ˆX s II w P                (19) 
From (18) and (19), we see that . As 
wage of skilled workers increases by more than the in- 
crease in price of exportable and that of the price of the 
intermediate, the real purchasing power in terms of both 
goods increases. However, real wage of unskilled worker 
falls in terms of final good, but it increases in terms of 
the intermediate good as with 
ˆ ˆ0, 0X I 
 ˆ 0, 0Iu
uI
Pr w     
This is because as “I” is used more in the production of X, 
following price rise, as return to capital does not change, 
via general equilibrium adjustment wage of unskilled 
gain because relatively more unskilled labor work with 
capital at the going rate of return. 
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, an increase in relative 
price of import-competing sector might improve wage 
inequality as wage of unskilled worker rises. 
Proof: From (4), we derive: 
ˆ ˆ ˆuY uI u uY I    w  where after simplification, 
 as 1, 0u uI kI I uY Y              (20a) 
Hence, we simplify to get:  
ˆ ˆuI I u
uY
Y w
             (20b) 
Using (9), we get from (20a and 20b),  
ˆ uI ˆ
I Y
uY
Y
  P
0
             (21) 
As , X production does not alter. Thus, fol- 
lowing as more unskilled labor move from 
I- to Y-sector, resulting in  From (9) and (10), 
we infer that in this case  
Given 
ˆ 0XP 
ˆ ˆ0, 0YP Y 
ˆ 0XP
ˆ 0.uw ˆ
ˆˆ0 0Y u IP w P     , from (11), we get  So, wage 
inequality decreases. 
ˆ 0.sw 
Proposition 3: An increase in relative price of export- 
able compared to the relative price of import competing 
sector might aggravate wage inequality; however, if 
price of import-competing sector rises more than that in 
exportable sector, it might improve the wage gap, but 
can reduce the output of the export sector.  
Proof: Using (10) and (11), we write:  
  
X sXP ws IX  uI uw              (22) 
 
uYˆ0Y sP w uw   


             (9) 
Applying Cramer’s rule for (9) and (22), 

ˆ
X
Y
P
P
    0
sX s
u
w
w
         
IX uI
uY
 
         (23) 
Thus, we get from (23): 
ˆ ˆ
X Y IX uIP Pˆ sw
 

  
where 
 as 1uY          (24a) SX  
and  
ˆ
ˆu
P
w Y SX

               (24b) 
From (24a & b), we infer that: 
1) if ˆ ˆ ˆ0,sX 0,
ˆ0,X YP P
0 0X uP P w P w    X Y s
ˆ ˆ ˆ0 0, 0w w
; and 2) 
if s u     . 
In the former case, clearly wage inequality rises while 
in the latter case, it falls. This is because as price of im- 
portable employing only unskilled worker goes up, more 
unskilled worker migrates to that sector at the expense of 
the intermediate good sector. Thus, output in intermedi- 
ates contracts, while export sector using output of I-sec- 
tor might suffer from fall in production. This is obvious 
from Equations (18) and (19).  
Corollary 2. If PX rises by more than PY, then direction 
of wage inequality depends on extent of rise in PY, pro- 
portionality factor, and relevant input shares. 
From (24a & b), simplifying, 
 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ , when 1XP  , 0.s u KI Y
IX
w w P  
 IX
Y
sX
P        
Thus, ˆ0, iff 0, 0YP ˆ ˆs uw w     It shows that direc- 
tionality of wage gap depends on relative price changes 
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between vertically integrated vis-à-vis traditional sector 
using unskilled labor shared with the outsourced inter- 
mediate good. 
3.2. Verbal Upshot 
Following the discussions in Section 3.1, we observe that 
in a general equilibrium theoretical model the recent up- 
surge in vertically integrated production structure and its 
impact through price and wage effects can be explained 
globalization and the great unbundling of production 
stages has caused delocalization via trade in intermedi- 
ates and services. The model delivers valuable insights 
such as wage gap and income shares. The integration of 
emerging countries like China and India has triggered 
new dynamics in skilled-unskilled wage effects. Although 
workers in less developed economies are less skilled than 
developed world, emerging economies will be the major 
source of skilled workers with shift in economic centre of 
gravity of skill and frugal innovation towards Asia. With 
this, as proposition 1 shows rise in demand for skilled 
workers will worsen wage inequality. Considering Pro- 
positions I and III, this replicates the presence of a 
“Dutch Disease” type of effect following the exogenous 
shock. In this framework, we demonstrate that as Sector 
“X” (traded at exogenously fixed world market prices) 
booms or expands, the other traded sector and non-traded 
sector contracts with different impacts on traded innova- 
tive (skilled) manufacturing sector depending on share of 
capital. Also, even with wage flexibility the perverse 
effect on the distribution of income causes immiseriza- 
tion. In other words, expansion of vertical intra-industry 
trade and relocation will cause wage divergence unless 
innovation in higher education would help raise the sup- 
ply of skilled workers. Proposition II shows that skill 
imbalances could be solved by concomitant rise in price 
in the sector using low-skilled workers exclusively. Thus, 
through labor-market reforms if there is an increase in 
demand for low-skilled workers the wage inequality will 
improve in favor of the unskilled. The immiserizing ef- 
fects might dissipate. At the theoretical plane, other than 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, fewer attempts [3,13,14,16] 
have been made to model such impacts due to onslaught 
of off-shoring. Here we establish a link between wage 
gap and an increase in outsourcing by multinationals from 
developed countries. Thus, the gap is likely to shrink in 
the face of an anticipated rise in price of domestic im- 
port-competing sector using low-skilled workers. There- 
fore, the model captures the relative importance of price 
changes in exports, imports, and intermediates for factor 
returns. 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
Using a mixed specific factor production structure based 
on [13,19] for a small open economy we have derived 
some results in the context of a vertical productive spec- 
trum happening under increasing mode of outsourcing 
off-shore. Structure based on Hecskscher-Ohlin-Samuel- 
son model has been used for explaining globalization and 
inequality. This particular structure could accommodate 
the phenomena of wage dispersion thanks to fragmenta- 
tion in a variant model. However, by offering edifice of a 
developing economy structure, the paper shows that cur- 
rent spate of supply chain for industrialization in India 
and China, among others, could cause wage dispersion 
without supportive public policy. For example, develop- 
ing better skilled workforce could be a way to reduce the 
wage gap existing between poor and non-poor. Not only 
is that, to attenuate the impact of foreign acquisition, 
complementary public policy to develop industry and 
appropriate skills necessary. Skilling the unskilled and 
protecting traditional sector are ways to balance the ad- 
verse effect.  
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